Denver Law Review
Volume 82
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys

Article 4

January 2005

Protection Orders: A Procedural Pacifier or a Vigorously Enforced
Protection Tool - A Discussion of the Tenth Circuit's Decision in
Gonzales v. Castle Rock
Michael Mattis

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Michael Mattis, Protection Orders: A Procedural Pacifier or a Vigorously Enforced Protection Tool - A
Discussion of the Tenth Circuit's Decision in Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 519 (2005).

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

PROTECTION ORDERS: A PROCEDURAL PACIFIER OR A
VIGOROUSLY ENFORCED PROTECTION TOOL? A
DISCUSSION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
GONZALES V. CASTLE ROCK
I. INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence is a serious problem in America today. By some
estimates, three to four million women a year are victimized by a husband or partner.' Some experts consider these estimates to be low, since
under-reporting is common due to the private nature of the crime.2
"Domestic
violence is the leading cause of injury to women in Amer3
ica."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took a
controversial and significant step for the protection of battered women in
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock. 4 Part I of this article discusses the problem of domestic violence and the prohibitive tool created by the legislatures and granted by the courts: the protection order. Part II of this article explains the Supreme Court's substantive due process precedent, litigation against the state for failure-to-protect, and DeShaney's holding
severely limiting state liability in a failure-to-protect situation. Part III of
this article discusses the history of procedural due process and the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Gonzales. Part IV describes and discusses why the
Gonzales decision is a good one and the public policy arguments for and
against the decision. In conclusion, Part V explains the implications of
the Gonzales decision, and its desired effect on relevant state actors.
A. Domestic Violence and Ordersof Protection

States began to recognize domestic violence as a serious problem in
the mid-1970's and responded by passing legislation enabling judges to
issue civil protection or restraining orders.5 Protection orders restrict one
party from contacting or harming another party and can be temporary or
permanent.6 The eligibility requirements necessary to obtain a temporary
1.

Sean D. Thueson, Civil Domestic Violence Protection Orders in Wyoming: Do They

Protect Victims of Domestic Violence?, 4 WYO. L. REV. 271, 275 (2004).
2.
Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders:An Opportunityfor Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 51,52 (2000).

3.
4.
5.

Thueson, supra note 1, at 275.
366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Waul, supra note 2, at 53; Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
499, 502 (2003) ("While improving the criminal justice response to domestic violence was an important piece of the new array of legal remedies, the enactment and expansion of civil protection or
restraining orders evolved into a primary strategy for improving the safety of battered women.").
6. Waul, supra note 2, at 54.
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protection order excluding a person from the family home vary among
the states; in Colorado, the courts require a showing that "physical or
emotional harm would otherwise result. ' 7 Currently, all 50 states and the
District of Columbia have laws enabling the issuance of protection or-9
ders. 8 Violation of a protection order can result in criminal charges.
Due to the
nature of the protection order, it "must be enforced to be ef10
fective."'

Unfortunately, many protection orders are under-enforced by the
police." Although there could be many potential reasons for nonenforcement, a prevalent reason is based in stereotyped views of
women. 12 For example, in Balistreriv. Pacifica Police Department, the
local police refused to enforce a protection order despite obvious evidence that Mr. Balistreri was assaulting and harassing his wife.' 3 The
police received each of Mrs. Balistreri's complaints "with ridicule"-on
one ''1
occasion
actually suggesting that Mrs. Balistreri "deserved the beat4
ing.

As a result of this problem, many women sue police departments
and municipalities under state tort law based on the police underenforcement of protection orders. 15 However, because state tort law only
affects individuals living in the victim's state, some women choose to
sue under the Constitution, alleging violations of equal protection 16 or
due process.' 7 A successful constitutional suit has much broader
implications,
resulting in enhanced protection for a greater number of
8
women.'

7.
8.
9.
10.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-108(2)(c) (2004).
Waul, supra note 2, at 53.
Id.at 54.
Thueson, supra note 1,at 304.

11.
Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of
Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1280, 1321 (1990).
12.
Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: IV. Making State

InstitutionsMore Responsive, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1990).
13. 901 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1988) (amended May 11, 1990) ("Balistreri's former husband
crashed his car into her garage, and Balistreri immediately called the police, who arrived at the scene
but stated that they would not arrest the husband or investigate the incident.").
14.
Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 698. See also Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understandingthe Problem, Forgingthe Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 269

n.8 (1985) (discussing a police sergeant that would not prosecute domestic violence cases because of
sexist opinions).
15.
E.g., Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 75 (N.Y. 1985); Nearing v. Weaver,
670 P.2d 137, 141 (Or. 1983).
16. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1988).
17.
See, e.g., Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 715 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
882 (1986).
18.
Borgmann, supra note 11,at 1287 ("A Constitution-based claim is available to women in
every state, unlike state tort actions, which vary with the vagaries of the tort law of each individual
state.").
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B. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
Constitutional claims are brought under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act. 19 Section 1983 establishes a private, civil cause of action for
20
citizens whose constitutional rights are violated by a state actor. The
pertinent part of section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-

bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-

tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-

tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law
21

Originally written as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the
Civil Rights Act provided "a federal right in federal courts because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the ...rights... guaranteed
' 22 by the Fourteenth
agencies.
state
the
by
denied
be
might
Amendment
23
The Supreme Court's decision in Parrattv. Taylor established two
24 First, a person must have
requirements to sustain a section 1983 action.
committed the action "acting under color of state law."2 Second, the
26
action must have deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.
Cases arise alleging either an affirmative act or an omission. In cases
where the State's failure to act is at issue, the plaintiff must prove the
27
State had "an affirmative duty to act and fail[ed] to fulfill this duty.
For a municipality to be liable under section 1983, "the action that
is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers., 28 The deprivations can consist of merely
customary practices and do not have to29be formally approved by the municipality' s decision-making channels.
Section 1983 is typically used in conjunction with either the Equal
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. In due
19.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).

20.
21.
22.

Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1284.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
Breaden Marshall Douthett, The Death of Constitutional Duty: The Court Reacts to the

24.

Parratt,451 U.S. at 535.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
See Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1285.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,690 (1978).
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

Expansion of Section 1983 Liability in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 643,643 (1991); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
23. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).

522
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process cases, liability claims come in two areas: substantive and procedural.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. History of Substantive Due Process
The doctrine of substantive due process declares that there are certain substantive constitutional rights that cannot be infringed upon by
governmental action. 30 Historically, the existence of these rights has
been a controversial subject since they are not specifically enumerated in
the Constitution but are derived from the "liberty" element of the Due
Process Clause. 31 Women suing police and municipalities for not enforcing protection orders often allege a deprivation of "liberty" without due
process of law. 32 This deprivation arises from the State's failure-toprotect the victim. 33 However, as evidenced by the Tenth Circuit's controversial decision in Gonzales, alleging a deprivation of procedural due
process based on a "property" interest may bring more success.34

The controlling case in the area of substantive due process rights for
state liability in failure-to-protect situations is DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services.35 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in DeShaney to settle the split between the circuits in their determination of a defendant's liability for failure-to-protect arising from a
"special relationship" with the State.36 Prior to DeShaney, several more
active Courts of Appeals held that a non-custodial "special relationship"
arose when the State recognized a danger and undertook protection of the
victim. 37 This "special relationship" created a duty to protect, enforced
38
through the Due Process Clause.
Although DeShaney did not involve the enforcement of protection
orders, it severely limited "failure-to-protect" substantive due process
cases by providing a narrow definition of the "special relationship" test.39
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court limited the application of the "special
relationship" test to situations in which the victim was in state custody. n

30.

MICHAEL ARIENS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PART II 313 (2004).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,191 (1989).
E.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194.
Id. at 197 n.4.
Id.
Douthett, supra note 22, at 646-47.
Id.
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B. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services
Joshua DeShaney was one year of age when his mother and father
were divorced. 4 A Wyoming court granted custody to Joshua's father,
Randy DeShaney, who subsequently relocated to Winnebago County,
Wisconsin. 42
In January of 1982, Mr. DeShaney's second wife reported child
abuse allegations to local police.43 Shortly after the report, a social
worker from the Winnebago Department of Social Services ("DSS")
was no
interviewed the father, who denied the charges of abuse." There
45
allegations.
1982
January
the
following
DSS
from
follow-up
One year later, in January of 1983, the police again suspected Mr.
DeShaney of child abuse when Joshua was admitted to the hospital "with
multiple bruises and abrasions." 46 The county assembled a team consisting of DSS caseworkers, a pediatrician, a detective, a psychologist, a
lawyer and various hospital personnel to make recommendations in
47
After finding insufficient evidence to justify placing
Joshua's case.
Joshua in state custody, the team recommended Joshua be enrolled in
preschool, for Mr. DeShaney to attend counseling, and for Mr. DeShaney's girlfriend to move out of his home.48 A month later, the local
hospital again notified DSS of Joshua's hospital admission with suspicious injuries, and again DSS determined "there was no basis for action.,,49
Throughout the following six months, a DSS caseworker visited the
DeShaney house on several occasions. 50 Although there was further evidence of abuse, DSS took no action. 51 Eventually, Randy DeShaney beat
left severely retarded and confined to
Joshua into a coma. 52 Joshua was 53
an institution for the rest of his life.
Joshua and his mother sued Winnebago County, DSS and several
individual employees of DSS for depriving Joshua "of his liberty without
due process of law, in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth

41.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.

42.

Id.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 192.
Id.
Id.
Id.

47.

Id.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 193.
Id.
Id.
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Amendment, by failing to intervene to protect him against a risk of violence at his father's hands of which they knew or should have known. 54
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
Joshua and his mother (petitioners) argued that the state had a "special relationship" with Joshua since they knew he was in danger and expressed their intention to protect him.5 5 This special relationship created
a duty to protect in the state, which should have been carried out "in a
reasonably competent fashion., 56 Petitioners further argued that the
State's incompetency in acting on their duty was an "abuse of governmental power that so 'shocks the conscience' ' 57 that it violated their substantive due process rights.5 8
The Court rejected petitioners' arguments, beginning its analysis by
examining the history and precedent of the Due Process Clause. 59 The
Court stated that the purpose of the Due Process Clause was to protect
people from government infringement of "life, liberty or property without 'due process of law.' 60 It was therefore not intended to "impose an
affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not
come to harm through other [private] means.'
The Court acknowledged that under the Constitution, there could be
circumstances requiring the government to provide care and protection to
individuals, but these circumstances were limited to situations where the
government exercised some sort of custody or control over the individual62 (for example, by providing medical care to prisoners, or by providing adequate services to mental patients "ensuring their 'reasonable
safety' from themselves and others.").63

Therefore, the Court found,

"[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge
of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act
on his own behalf."64
Since Joshua's father was not a state actor, and Joshua was not in
state custody when he was injured, the elements required for a successful

54.

Id.

55.

Id. at 197.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).

58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 195.

61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 199 (stating "by reason of the deprivation of his liberty [to] care for himself, it is

only 'just' that the State be required to care for him") (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291,
293 (N.C. 1926)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 200.
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substantive due process claim were not present.65 Therefore, "the State
had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua." 66
Although the DeShaney Court's holding is a limitation on "failureto-protect" substantive due process claims, it left the door open for a
claim based on procedural due process in two ways. First, the DeShaney
Court acknowledged the existence of potential liability if the "courts and
legislatures impose ...affirmative duties of care and protection upon its
agents. .. " such as through a court-issued protection order with a corresponding statute mandating enforcement. 67 Additionally, the DeShaney
Court declined to consider petitioners' procedural due process argument
due to an error in the pleadings, leaving the possibility open for a "fail68
Based on these
ure-to-protect" case based on procedural due process.
two factors, a state actor could incur a duty to protect, and a tort commit69
ted by a state actor could turn into a constitutional violation.

I1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. History of ProceduralDue Process
The foundation of the Due Process Clause is set in Chapter 39 of
Magna Carta. 70 Chapter 39 states, "No free man shall be taken, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or
prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law
of the land."' The drafters of the Magna Carta sought to abolish the ad
hoc trials of the period, which provided no procedural protections to its
72
citizens, often resulting in the use of improvised laws to try cases.
The Due Process Clause, set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, states "[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
The Supreme
liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. .
from
government
federal
the
prohibiting
as
clause
Court interprets this
the
giving
first
without
property
or
liberty
depriving any citizen of life,
74
to
opportunity
The
heard.
to
be
an
opportunity
citizen 1) notice and 2)
a
meaningful
in
and
time
a
meaningful
be heard7 5"must be granted at
manner."

65.

Id. at 201.

66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 202.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 201-02.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968).
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 169.

72.

Id.

73.
74.
75.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1864).
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
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For cases alleging a deprivation of property, the first element of7a6
procedural due process claim is the identification of a property interest.
Property interests can be intangible, as in the enforcement of a protection
order, or tangible, such as personal or real property. When the State is
taking a person's tangible property, the procedural due process violation
is usually evident. For example, in Fuentes v. Shevin,77 Margarita
Fuentes purchased various items on credit from Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. 78 Ms. Fuentes paid her monthly bill for over a year, when a dispute arose causing her to discontinue payments. 79 As a result, Firestone
went to small claims court and obtained a writ of replevin, seizing the
goods on the very same day.80 In granting the replevin order, the court
gave Ms. Fuentes no prior notice, nor an opportunity to dispute the order.8' Ms. Fuentes subsequently challenged the replevin procedure in
federal court, charging that it violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.82 The Court held that "[T]he constitutional
right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a
fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his
possessions. 83 Creditors could seize goods to protect their security in4
terests but not until a fair hearing validated their claim.
A difficulty in procedural due process cases arises where the property interest is not as clear as in Fuentes. For example, in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 85 the property interest involved a citizen's entitlement to welfare
benefits. Residents receiving public assistance challenged New York
State's termination of their benefits without notice or a hearing of any
kind.86 The state's procedure provided for a post-deprivation hearing,
but the appellees argued the insufficiency of providing a hearing after the
termination of benefits. 87 Based on welfare recipients' dependence on
state funds for their food and shelter, the Court, characterizing welfare
entitlements as a property interest, held that welfare benefits were a
"statutory entitlement," and termination constituted state action adjudicating "important rights. 88 The Court specifically rejected the argument
that welfare is a "privilege" and not a "right."89

76.

See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) ("[[]t is our practice to begin the inquiry

with a determination of the precise nature of the private interest that is threatened by the State.").
77.
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
78.
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 70.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 96.

85.

397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970).

86.
87.
88.
89.

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256.
Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 262.
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The decision in Goldberg evidenced the Court's willingness to find
90
property interests in entitlements such as public assistance benefits.
Under Goldberg, the enforcement of a protection order would have been
declared a property right. 91 Unfortunately, the entitlement revolution
started by Goldberg was soon limited by subsequent decisions, making
the determination of a property right in public assistance benefits less
predictable.92
In Board of Regents v. Roth,9 3 the Court trimmed the Goldberg decision in finding that property rights were not created by the constitution. 94 Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh ("University") hired David
Roth to teach political science during the period of September 1, 1968
and June 30, 1969. 95 After this term was completed, the University notiyear.96
fied Roth of its decision not to re-hire him for the next academic
The University gave Roth neither a reason nor an opportunity to challenge the decision. 97 Since Mr. Roth had not been employed by the University for the statutory "four years of year-to-year employment," he was
considered a non-tenured employee.98 Wisconsin state law clearly gave
99
the University the discretion whether to re-hire non-tenured teachers.
Mr. Roth challenged his termination, alleging in part that the failure
of the University to give him a reason or fair hearing violated his procedural due process rights.' ° In evaluating Mr. Roth's claim, the Court
looked to the nature of the right to determine if it qualified as "property"
as specified by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 '
Departing from Goldberg, the Court in Roth further narrowed entitlement property interests to rights created and defined by "existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits."'' 02 Thus, in Roth, the property
interest was only a temporary one created by the "terms of his employment." 0 3 Since the terms specified employment between the periods of
September 1, 1968 and June 30, 1969, the property interest terminated

90.

Id.

91.

See id. at 262 n.8.

92.

Douthett, supra note 22, at 651-52.

93. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
94. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
95. Id. at 566.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 568.
98. Id. at 566.
99. Id. at 567.
100. Id. at 569.
Id. at 570-71 (stating "the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not
101.
infinite.").
Id. at 577.
102.
Id. at 578.
103.
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concurrently with the terms. 1°4 Although Mr. Roth had a personal interest
10 5
in re-employment, the Court found he did not have a property interest.
Since Roth, the Court has identified many other entitlement property interests protected by the Due Process Clause. These interests include continued public employment, 0 6 a free education, 0 7 garnished
wages, 0 8 professional licenses,'0 9 driver's licenses,11 0 causes of action,"'
and the receipt of government utility services. 2 However, it was not
until the Tenth Circuit's bold decision in Gonzales that a federal court
found a property right in the enforcement of a protection order.113
B. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock
On May 21, 1999, Ms. Gonzales went to state court seeking a pro-4
tection order to limit her husband's contact with their three daughters."
The court granted the order under Colorado Revised Statute § 14-10-108,
excluding Mr. Gonzales from the family home based on Ms. Gonzales'
' 5
showing "that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result.""1
The protection order mandated that Mr. Gonzales stay "at least 100 yards
away from the property at all times" and specified violation of the order
could result in arrest and prosecution. 1 6 The order also warned that police officers would use "every reasonable means" in enforcing the order,
subjecting violators to arrest and detention in "the nearest jail or deten-

tion facility."'

17

Mr. Gonzales received the order on June 4, 1999, and the court
made the order permanent that same day. 18 The permanent order specified that Mr. Gonzales could not see his children with the exception of
two circumstances.1 19 First, provided reasonable notice to Ms. Gonzales,
Mr. Gonzales was allowed "a mid-week dinner visit with the minor children.' 120 Second, the order permitted Mr. Gonzales to gather the children "for the purpose of parental time.''
In each case, during Mr. Gon-

104.

Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55,64 (1979).
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,428 (1982).
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1109 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1096.

115.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-108 (2004).
116.
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1096.
117.
Id. at 1097 (citing SUSAN WENDALL WHICHER & CHERYL LOETSCHER, HANDBOOK OF
COLORADO FAMILY LAW, ch. IV, F-12 at 2 (3d ed. 1996)).
118.
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1097.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
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zales' visits
he was not to "molest or disturb the peace" at Ms. Gonzales'
22
home. 1
On June 22, 1999, between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., Mr. Gonzales violated the order and abducted the children from Ms. Gonzales' front
yard. 23 Ms. Gonzales learned the children were missing at approximately 7:30 p.m. and, immediately suspecting Mr. Gonzales, called the
Castle Rock police. 124 Shortly thereafter, Officers Brink and Ruisi arrived at Ms. Gonzales' home and reviewed the protection order. 25 The
officers did not comply with the order's terms, and told Ms. Gonzales
"there was nothing they could do."' 126 They directed Ms. Gonzales to call
the police station
again if Mr. Gonzales did not return her children by
27
10:00 p.m.'
At approximately 8:30 p.m., Mr. Gonzales called Ms. Gonzales and
informed her that he had taken the children to Elitch Gardens, a Denver
amusement park. 28 Upon receiving this information, Ms. Gonzales
called the police a second time to report the whereabouts of her husband. 129 Again, Officer Brink told her to wait until 10:00 p.m. 130 Ms.
Gonzales anxiously waited until 10:00 p.m. when she phoned the police
again.' 31 Unfortunately, Ms. Gonzales received no assistance; dispatch
told her to wait another two hours.' 32 Ms. Gonzales followed the dis133
patcher's instructions and waited until midnight to place a fourth call.
With the midnight call provoking no action by police, Ms. Gonzales
drove to Mr. Gonzales' apartment to look for the girls. 34 Upon finding
no one home, Ms. Gonzales phoned police for a fifth time. 135 Despite
receiving instructions to wait at the apartment complex until police arrived, no police officer ever met Ms. Gonzales. 136 At 12:50 a.m., Ms.
Gonzales drove to the Castle Rock police station and filed an incident
report with Officer Ahlfinger. 137 Officer Ahlfinger subsequently made
no attempt to enforce the protection order's terms by finding and arrest' 138
ing Mr. Gonzales but instead "went to dinner.

122.
123.

Id.
Id.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

128.

Id.

129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1097-98.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
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Approximately eight hours after Ms. Gonzales' initial call to the police, Mr. Gonzales arrived at the police station and opened fire. 139 The
police shot and killed him at the scene and, upon searching his truck,
found the dead bodies of the three children. 14 0 He killed them earlier that
day. 141
Ms. Gonzales sued the City of Castle Rock and Officers Ahlfinger,
Brink and Ruisi under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 142 She alleged the officers violated her substantive and procedural due process
rights by failing to enforce the protection order against her husband, and
that the city tolerated the officers' non-enforcement of protection orders
of a person's right to police protecresulting in "the reckless disregard
143
tion granted by such orders."'

C. The UnitedStates Court of Appealsfor the Tenth Circuit'sDecision

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Ms. Gonzales' case, finding she failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.44 On appeal, a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed Ms. Gonzales' substantive due process claim but held the procedural due process claim could
proceed. 145 The City of Castle Rock and Officers Ahlfinger, Brink and
review of the panel decision and were granted rehearing en
Ruisi sought
46
banc.1
The en banc court reviewed the panel's decision on April 29,
2004.147 Briefly addressing the panel's dismissal of Ms. Gonzales' substantive due process claim, the court stressed that under DeShaney "the
Constitution itself does not require a state to protect its citizens from
third party harm."' 148 Since the State did not create the danger in Ms.
Gonzales' case, a "danger creation" exception could not be sustained,
and since DeShaney put an end to the expansion of constitutional liability
using the "special relationship" test, the court dismissed Ms. Gonzales'
substantive due process claim. 149
In discussing Ms. Gonzales' procedural due process claim, the court
first distinguished procedural from substantive due process. 150 Proce139.
140.

Id.
Id.

141.

Id.

142.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

147.

Id. at 1096.

148.

Id. at 1099.

149.

Id.

143.

150. Id. ("Contrary to the assertions of the city and officers, as well as those of our dissenting
colleagues, the issue before this en banc court is distinct from the substantive due process claim
dismissed below.").
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dural due process claims stem from state law.151 Substantive due process
claims are brought based on rights contained in and protected by the
Constitution. 5 2 Note that while the Court in DeShaney held "nothing in
the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors,"153 it left the door open for state-created property rights imposing
"affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents.' 54 Thus, the
court analyzed Ms. Gonzales' case to determine 1) whether state law,
through granting the protection order, created a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 55 and, if so, 2) ' whether
the State
56
denied Ms. Gonzales "an appropriate level of process."'
1. Determination of a Property Interest
The Gonzales Court acknowledged Tenth Circuit precedent, holding
that statutory mandates alone cannot create a property interest-but
stressed a different situation was present in this case.' 57 Ms. Gonzales
held a court-issued protection order that was also mandated by state statute.1 58 The court held that it was the combination of the state statute and
the protection59order, both mandating enforcement, that created the property interest.1
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Olim v. Wakinekona, the
court stressed that an entitlement property interest is only created when
there are "objective and defined criteria" for a decision maker to follow.' 6 If the decision maker "can deny the requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all, the State has not
created a constitutionally protected . . . interest.'16' In applying these
standards to Gonzales, the en banc court found both the protection order
and the state statute relied upon by Ms. Gonzales contained mandatory
language and specific criteria for a decisionmaker to follow.' 62 The protection order set forth the state's intent to enforce with language mandating that police "use every reasonable means to enforce this restraining
order," and officers "shall take the restrained person to the nearest jail or
detention facility ....163 Likewise, the statute contains similar language
151.

Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: IV. Making State

InstitutionsMore Responsive, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1551, 1562 (1993).
152.
153.

Id.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.

154. Id. at201. ("A State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative
duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes.").
155. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1100.
156.
157.

Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1101.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983).
Olim,461 U.S. at 249.
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1103-04.
Id.
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ordering the arrest of the order's violator, "or, if an arrest would be impractical.. . , seek a warrant for the arrest ... when the peace officer has

information amounting to probable cause that the restrained person has
order. '' 64
violated or attempted to violate any provision of the restraining
Recognizing that police officers must use some judgment in their determination of probable cause, the court noted that "objectively ascertainable standards" are used to evaluate probable cause decisions based on
"what a reasonably well-trained officer would know."'1 65 Therefore, in
the court's view, a statute requiring a showing of probable cause met the
and defined criteria" for a decision maker to
requirement of "objective
66
follow set in Olim.1
The Tenth Circuit's holding-that a court-ordered protection order
containing mandatory language requiring enforcement, based on specific
objective criteria, created a constitutionally protected property interesthad some support from other district courts, 16 7 but no other circuit court
had gone this far. 68
For example, the court in Gonzales cited a district court's decision
70
in Coffman v. Wilson Police Department 69 as support for its ruling. In
Coffman, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania analyzed facts disturbingly similar to those in Gonzales.
Coffman involved the police's refusal to enforce a protection order de17
spite repeated calls from the victim requesting assistance. ' Noting that
in DeShaney the Supreme Court "specifically did not reach whether a
Roth entitlement might have existed,"' 172 the court in Coffman examined73
enforcement.'
the statute and protection order for language mandating
Although the use of the words "[the arrest] may be without warrant" in
the statute were obviously precatory, the protection order contained the
mandatory, unambiguous phrase "the police department shall enforce the
[protection] orders."'' 74 The court opined, "The word 'shall' is mandatory, not precatory, and its use in a simple declarative sentence brooks no
contrary interpretation.' 7 5 Based on the mandatory language in the pro-

164.

Id. at 1104.

165.

Id. at 1105.

166.

Olim, 461 U.S. at 249.

See Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Siddle v.
167.
Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1131 n.2 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) ("In nearly fifteen years since
168.
DeShaney no other circuit has ventured this far.").
See Coffinan, 739 F. Supp. at 254.
169.
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1102.
170.
Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 260.
171.
172. Id. at 264 n.7.
Id. at 264.
173.
174. Id.
175.

Id.
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tection order, the court found a "property interest in police enforcement
16
[of a protection order] that is cognizable under Roth."
2. Determination of an Appropriate Level of Process
Once the court established that Ms. Gonzales had a protected interest in the enforcement of the protection order, the next step was to determine whether she was denied "an appropriate level of process."' 177 An
acceptable level of process can generally be stated as "the opportunity to
78
be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."",1
In Parrattv. Taylor, the Supreme Court held that random actions of
a state actor cannot be the basis of a procedural due process claim if there
is an adequate post-deprivation remedy available. 79 However, Ms. Gonzales did not allege the non-enforcement of her protection order was
"random" but argued the non-action resulted from a "custom and policy
of the City of Castle Rock not to enforce domestic abuse protection orders."' 8 °

In ignoring Ms. Gonzales' requests for enforcement of her protection order, the court held that she did not receive any process at all.' 8 '
While the court deemed a formal pre-deprivation hearing impractical and
a post-deprivation hearing ineffective, it suggested that "something less
than a full evidentiary hearing [would be] sufficient.' 8 2 As an example,
the court used the process required in' 83 Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft.184 In Memphis Light, customers sued their utility company
for shutting off their service without providing adequate notice and process. 85 The Supreme Court held that procedural due process was satisfied
if a customer had an opportunity to talk with a company employee who
could correct billing mistakes before terminating utility services. 186
The Gonzales Court possessed an undeveloped record, so they were
unable to develop specific procedures in determining what process was
due. 87 However, the court used the statute for direction and suggested a
general process for dealing with protection orders. 88 The process required "police officers to determine whether a valid order exists, whether
probable cause exists that the restrained party is violating the order, and
176. Id.
177.
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Farthing v. City of Shawnee, 39 F.3d 1131,
1135 (10th Cir. 1994)).
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 1111 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-43 (1981).
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1112-13.
Id. at I IIIn.15.

182.
183.

Id. at 1114 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985)).
Id. at 1115.

184.
185.
186.
187.

Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 11.
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1115.
Id.

188.

Id. at 1116.
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whether probable cause exists that the restrained party has notice of the
order." 189 After completion of these steps, if it is determined the protection order does not warrant mandatory enforcement, the person holding
190 The court
the order should be notified of the determination and why.
speculated that if the police had followed the procedures outlined in the
19 1
statute, the Gonzales children's lives might have been spared.
Although the court held Ms. Gonzales' section 1983 action could
proceed, it could only proceed against the municipality. 192 The standard
for holding police officers liable requires it be "sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would have understood that his conduct violated the
right."' 193 The court held the officers were therefore entitled to qualified
immunity, since prior to this decision "a reasonable officer would [not]
have known that a restraining order, coupled with a statute mandating its
would create a constitutionally protected property interenforcement,
94
1

est.'

IV. GONZALES ARGUMENTS

One of the main reasons the dissenters in Gonzales were unwilling
to expand state protective services under the Fourteenth Amendment was
a fear of endless lawsuits being brought against the State. 195 In his dissent, Judge Kelly quoted the First Circuit case of Estate of Gilmore v.
Buckley:
Enormous economic consequences could follow from the reading of
the fourteenth amendment that plaintiff here urges. Firemen who
have been alerted to a victim's peril but fail to take effective action;
municipal ambulances which, when called, arrive late; and myriad
other errors by state officials in providing protective services, could
196
all be found to violate the Constitution.

However, this parade of horrors argument misses the point and
overlooks the narrow 197 holding of the majority in Gonzales. In finding a
property interest in the enforcement of a protection order, the court specifically required the order 1) be issued by a court, 2) contain mandatory
language requiring enforcement, and 3) must also contain "specific ob-

189.
190.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.

191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1117 (quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001)).

194.
195.

Id. at 1117-18.
Douthett, supra note 22, at 651.

196.
197.

Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 722-23 (1st Cir. 1986).
See, e.g., Lauren L. McFarlane, Note, The Right To Privacy One Hundred Years Later,

Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When The Police Will Not Respond?, 41

CASE W. RES. L. REv. 929, 964-65 (1991) ("At the moment, there are few states with statutory
grants of protection clear enough to support [procedural due process] claims.").
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jective criteria curtailing .. decisionmaking discretion ....,1 Additionally, adding weight to its conclusion, the court considered factors
such as the mandatory language in the statute enabling the granting of a
protection order, the statute's legislative history, and, absent malice, bad
faith or non-compliance with adopted rules, the granting of immunity to
police in their enforcement of a protection order. 199
In applying the Gonzales analysis to the case of a firefighter not responding to a fire or an ambulance that is late to the scene of the accident, it is obvious that these cases would never get past the determination
of a property interest stage of the trial. Neither case involves a specific
statute coupled with a court-ordered protection order. 200 The court in
Gonzales was very clear: this holding does not apply to situations in
which a state statute mandates outlined procedures, absent a court order. 20 ' For example, the court distinguished Doe by Nelson v. Milwaukee
Co. from Gonzales.2 ° 2 In the court's view, the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Doe was correct in not finding a property interest in child protective
services created solely by a state statute. 203 Mandatory language in a
state statute alone is not enough. 20 4 Accordingly, the elements required
to find a property interest in Gonzales leave little room for the endless
expansion of due process rights and the potential for a litany of lawsuits
against the State.
Another argument criticizing the holding in Gonzales claims that
requiring police to "conduct pre-deprivation hearings" when dealing with
protection orders is impractical.20 5 This contention arises from a misunderstanding of the process the court required due. The Gonzales process
requires "three basic steps" that would take police "only ... minutes to
perform. ,,20620A pre-deprivation hearing is not required.20 7 The steps outlined by the court provide an opportunity for individuals to have their
protection order enforcement requests examined and, therefore, minimizing the risk of random, arbitrary denials.20 8 As the Supreme Court stated
in Roth:
It can scarcely be argued that government would be crippled by a requirement that the reason be communicated to the person most directly affected by the government's action ....As long as the gov198.

199.
200.
201.
202.
1990)).

Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1109.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 100 n.4.
Id. (distinguishing Doe by Nelson v. Milwaukee Co., 903 F.2d 499, 502-03 (7th Cir.

203.
204.

Id. at I100 n.4.
Id.

205.

Id.

206.

Id. at 1116.

207.
208.

Id.
Id.
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ernment has a good reason for its actions it need not fear disclosure.
It is only where the government acts improperly that procedural due

process is truly burdensome. And that is precisely when it is most
209

necessary.

Finally, the dissenters also argued that "it will always be possible
for plaintiffs to recharacterize their substantive due process claims
against arbitrary action by executive officials as 'procedural due process'
claims ...

,2

10 For example, in the Tenth Circuit case Abeyta by &

Through Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 9,211 a teacher
was sued for continually calling his twelve-year-old student a "prostitute. ,,2 12 The student alleged the teacher violated her substantive due
process rights "to be free from invasion of her personal security by sex213 The court
ual abuse and harassment and by psychological abuse.,
denied the student's claim, holding "extreme verbal21 4abuse typically is
insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation.,
Judge McConnell argues that, in light of Gonzales, the student in
Abeyta should have "styled the claim as a procedural deprivation (of her
liberty interest in personal security and emotional well-being) and alshe was a
leged that the real harm was that the teacher determined 21that
5
question.,
the
on
hearing
a
holding
first
prostitute without
However, just because Abeyta could be styled as a procedural due
process claim, it does not mean that it is logical to do so; nor does it
mean the result in Abeyta would be different. In Judge McConnell's
hypothetical, the plaintiff in Abeyta would have to show that being called
a "prostitute" was authorized by state policy and not "a result of a ran16
dom and unauthorized act by a state employee. 2 The teacher's actions
in Abeyta were obviously random and not state policy. Therefore, a remedy in state court would be all that the Due Process Clause requires; the
21 7
plaintiff would be denied an opportunity to sue in federal court.
Gonzales' narrow holding-that a court-ordered protection order
containing mandatory language requiring enforcement, based on specific
objective criteria, created a constitutionally protected property interestdoes not endlessly expand state liability. It does not create stifling police
procedure. It does not allow the skirting of substantive due process
precedent, such as the Court's decision in DeShaney. It does provide
enhanced protection to battered women and their children by ensuring
209.
210.
211.

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972).
Id. at 1129.
77 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1996).

212.

Abeyta, 77 F.3d at 1254.

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. at 1256.
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1130 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981).

217.

Developments in the Law, supra note 151, at 1566.
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that every request for the enforcement of a protection order is evaluated
in the same way.
V. CONCLUSION

On November 1, 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the State's
appeal of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gonzales.2'8 Lawyers for the
state want to portray the decision as potentially bankrupting "municipal
governments for their inevitable instances of 'less than perfect' law enforcement." -219 "[L]ess than perfect" is an obvious understatement. 220
As the Court in DeShaney recognized, procedural due process rights
provide a remedy where substantive due process falls short. In using
procedural due process, Gonzales provides a framework for citizens to
have their protection order enforcement requests evaluated, as well as
providing a sufficient cause of action against police and municipalities
for arbitrarily refusing enforcement. The holding does not violate the
constitutional concept of "negative rights," nor does it needlessly expand
state liability.
The substantial step taken in Gonzales also sends a broad message
to police and municipalities that courts, as well as the legislature, consider domestic violence as a serious problem and are committed to its
eradication. With a potential federal lawsuit involved, state officials may
think twice before ignoring a request for enforcement of a protection
order. Procedural due process, in the words of Justice Douglas, "spells
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.
Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance
221
that there will be equal justice under law.",
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218.
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